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Abstract
In Content-Centric Networks (CCNs) as a possible future Internet, new kinds of attacks and security challenges -from
Denial of Service (DoS) to privacy attacks- will arise. An efficient and effective security mechanism is required to
secure content and defense against unknown and new forms of attacks and anomalies. Usually, clustering algorithms
would fit the requirements for building a good anomaly detection system. K-means is a popular anomaly detection
method to classify data into different categories. However, it suffers from the local convergence and sensitivity to
selection of the cluster centroids. In this paper, we present a novel fuzzy anomaly detection system that works in two
phases. In the first phase -the training phase- we propose an hybridization of Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
and K-means algorithm with two simultaneous cost functions as well-separated clusters and local optimization to
determine the optimal number of clusters. When the optimal placement of clusters centroids and objects are defined,
it starts the second phase. In this phase -the detection phase- we employ a fuzzy approach by the combination of two
distance-based methods as classification and outlier to detect anomalies in new monitoring data. Experimental results
demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can achieve to the optimal number of clusters, well-separated clusters, as
well as increase the high detection rate and decrease the false positive rate at the same time when compared to some
other well-known clustering algorithms.
Keywords: Content-Centric Networks, Anomaly Detection, Particle Swarm Optimization, K-means, Clustering
Analysis, Fuzzy Set
1. Introduction
Content-Centric Networking (CCN, also referred to
as Information-Centric Networking or Data-Centric
Networking, Named-Data Networking) has emerged to
overcome the inherent limitations of the current In-
ternet regarding content security and privacy, and to
provide a better trust model [1, 2]. Unlike the cur-
rent Internet (host-centric approach) in which security
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mechanisms are based on the communication chan-
nels between hosts, in the content-centric network, se-
curity mechanisms must be applied to the Informa-
tion Objects (IOs) themselves independently of its stor-
age location and physical representation [3, 4]. Con-
sequently, new information-centric security concepts
based on the information itself are required [1]. With
this new paradigm, new kinds of attacks and anoma-
lies -from Denial of Service (DoS) to privacy attacks-
will arise [5]. Attacks and anomalies are deliberate ac-
tions against data, contents, software or hardware that
can destroy, degrade, disrupt or deny access to a com-
puter network [6]. Hence, the contents should be re-
silient against both DoS and new forms of (unknown)
attacks or at least limit their effectiveness [7]. In or-
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der to disarm new kinds of attacks, anomalous traffics,
and any deviation, not only the detection of the malevo-
lent behavior must be achieved, but the network traf-
fic belonging to the attackers should be also blocked
[8, 9, 10]. In an attempt to tackle with the new kinds
of anomalies and the threat of future unknown attacks,
many researchers have been developing Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS) to help filter out known malware,
exploits and vulnerabilities [6, 11]. Anomaly detec-
tion systems are becoming increasingly vital and valu-
able tools of any network security infrastructure in order
to mitigate disruptions in normal delivery of network
services due to malicious activities, Denial of Service
(DOS) attacks and network intrusions [12, 13]. An IDS
dynamically monitors logs and network traffics, apply-
ing detection algorithms to identify potential intrusions
and anomalies within a network [14]. In recent years,
data mining techniques specially unsupervised anomaly
detection have been employed with much success in the
area of intrusion detection [15, 16, 17]. Generally, un-
supervised learning or cluster analysis algorithms have
been utilized to discover natural groupings of objects
and find features inherent and their deviations with sim-
ilar characteristics to solve the detection problems of
the abnormal traffics and unknown forms of new attacks
[18, 19]. Data clustering algorithms can be either hier-
archical or partitioning [20, 21]. In this paper, we focus
on the partitioning clustering and in particular, a pop-
ular method called K-means clustering algorithm. The
K-means algorithm is one of the most efficient cluster-
ing algorithms [22, 23, 24]. This algorithm is simple,
easy to implement, straightforward, suitable for large
data sets, and very efficient with linear time complexity
[25]. However, it suffers from two main drawbacks: (1)
the random selection of centroid points and determining
the number of clusters may lead to different clustering
results, (2) The cost function is not convex and the K-
means algorithm may contain many local optimum [26].
In the previous work [27], we employed K-means clus-
tering in our anomaly detection system over CCN. But,
the results were not appropriate due to the large num-
ber of clusters, trapping in the local optimum solution,
and changing results by running the algorithm with the
constant parameters in several times. However, if good
initial clustering centroids can be assigned by any of
other global optimal searching techniques, the K-means
would work well in refining the cluster centroids to find
the optimal centroids [28, 29].
To overcome these drawbacks, we present a fuzzy
anomaly detection system in two phases: training and
detection. In the training phase, we apply a meta-
heuristic algorithm called PSO (Particle Swarm Opti-
mization) which can find the optimal or near optimal
solution by the least iterations [30, 31, 32]. We employ
the combination of the ability of global search of the
PSO with a novel boundary handling approach and the
fast convergence of the K-means to avoid being trapped
in a local optimal solution.
On the other hand, the most clustering methods usually
try to minimize the Mean Square Error (MSE) between
data points and their cluster centroids [33, 34]. The
MSE is not suitable for determining the optimal number
of clusters. Since it decreases, the number of the clus-
ters increase. We develop our method for globally opti-
mal placement of data points as well-separated clusters
by low intra-cluster cohesion and high inter-cluster sep-
aration. But the optimal placement can increase MSE
[35]. Thus, we apply MSE for local optimization, i.e.,
in the case of each cluster separately to decrease the er-
ror caused by corresponding data points and their clus-
ter centroids. This simultaneous approach -application
of two cost functions (well-separated clusters and local
optimization)- in PSO can lead to the optimal number
of clusters and well-separated clusters. When the opti-
mal placement of clusters centroids and objects are de-
fined, they are sent to the second phase. In the detection
phase, we apply a novel fuzzy decision approach to give
a fuzzy detection of normal or abnormal results in the
new monitoring data that do not appear in the training
data set. Because fuzzy approach can reduce the false
positive rate with higher reliability in determining intru-
sive activities, due to any data (normal or attack) may be
similar (closest distance) to some clusters.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
related work. Section 3 presents security issues in CCN.
Section 4 provides a general overview of the PSO algo-
rithm. The K-means clustering algorithm and clustering
problem are surveyed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.
Fuzzy set theory describes in Section 7. Section 8 de-
scribes our proposed method. Section 9 contains exper-
imental results and analysis. Finally, we conclude in
Section 10.
2. Related Work
Using hybrid algorithms for improving the clustering
performance is not a novel idea. The novelty of our pro-
posed method is using a swarm intelligence algorithm,
specifically PSO algorithm, with K-means in order to
optimize clustering results based on two simultaneous
metrics: (1) well-separated clusters by low intra-cluster
and high inter-cluster distances and (2) local optimiza-
tion by MSE (Mean Square Error). We apply a new
boundary handling approach for PSO algorithm to not
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Table 1: Comparison of hybrid PSO + K-means approaches in clustering problems
Approach Raw data Parameters value Cost function Contribution
Junyan
Chen
(2012)
[36]
a commercial website log
file with 726 clients and 52
pages which clustered sep-
arately to 15, 25 and 35
classes
iteration: 50
∑m
j=1
∑
∀xn d(xn, zi, j), xn is the
data point, and zi j refers to the jth
cluster centroid of the ith particle,
and d is the position of the parti-
cles.
an hybrid PSO for initial seeds
in K-means by incorporating the
multidimensional asynchronism and
stochastic disturbance model to the
velocity, called MSPSO-K.
Zhenkui
et al.
(2008)
[37]
city coordinates of Hopfield-
10 TSP (10 records) and Iris
(150 records)
c1 = c2 = 1.3, w linearly
reduces from 1.0 to 0.3,
iteration: 10, population
size: 10 (first data), 130
(second data)
(1)max(
∑
∀xi∈y j
d(xi ,y j )∣∣∣∣y j ∣∣∣∣ )
(2)min(d(yi ,y j)),∀i, j,i, j , (1) is the
maximum value of the mean of
distances within same classes,
and (2) is the minimum value of
distances between classes.
a combination of the core idea of K-
means with PSO, which it leads to
the clustering algorithm with low er-
ror rate as compared to K-means.
Cui &
Potok
(2005)
[38]
artificial data sets: ds1 (414,
6429, 9), ds2 (313, 5804, 8),
ds3 (204, 5832, 6), ds4 (878,
7454, 10) (1st: number of
documents, 2nd: number
of terms, 3rd: number of
classes)
c1 = c2 = 1.49, w =
0.72 (in the PSO, w re-
duces 1% at each itera-
tion but for hybrid it is
constant), iteration: 50,
population size: 50
ADVDC =
∑Nc
i=1[
∑Pi
j=1 d(Oi ,mi, j)
Pi
]
Nc
, mi, j
denotes the jth document vector
belongs to the cluster i, Oi is the
centroid vector of ith cluster, Pi
stands for the document number
belongs to the cluster Ci, and Nc
stand for the cluster number.
an hybrid PSO-Kmeans document
clustering algorithm presents to per-
forms fast document clustering. The
cluster quality measured with AD-
VDC (average distance between doc-
uments and the cluster centroid)
which the smaller ADVDC value re-
sults the more compact clusters.
Merwe
&
Engel-
brecht
(2003)
[39]
two 2-dimensional artificial
data set (n=400 with c=2
and n=600 with c=4), Iris
(n=150, c=3, d=4), Wine
(n=178, c=3, d=13), Breast-
cancer (d=9, c=2), Automo-
tive (n=500, d=11), n: num-
ber of data, c: number of
class, d: number of attribute
c1 = c2 = 1.49, w =
0.72, iteration: 1000,
population size 10
∑Nc
j=1[
∑
∀Zp∈Ci j
d(Zp ,m j )∣∣∣∣Ci j ∣∣∣∣ ]
Nc
,
∣∣∣Ci j∣∣∣ is the
number of data vectors belonging
to cluster Ci j, m j refers to the jth
cluster centroid, Zp denotes the
centroid vector of cluster j, and
Nc is the number of the cluster
centroid vectors.
the result of the K-means algorithm
utilized as one particle, while the rest
of the swarm is initialized randomly.
The quality is measured by the low
intra-cluster (distance between data
within a cluster), and high inter-
cluster distance (distance between the
centroids of the clusters).
Xiao
et al.
(2006)
[40]
1st data set for training
and developing normal clus-
ters (97,278 normal sam-
ples) and the 2nd data set
for evaluation (60,593 nor-
mal and 250,436 attack sam-
ples) from KDDCup 1999
w decreases linearly by
(w1 −w2) ∗ Max iter−iterMax iter +
w2, limit the velocity to
sign(vid)vdmax if it ex-
ceeds a positive constant
value vdmax
f = 11+Jc , Jc =∑k
j=1
∑
Xi∈C j d(Xi,Z j), d(Xi,Z j)
is Euclidean distance between
a data point Xi and the cluster
center Z j.
it is an anomaly intrusion detection
system based on combination of PSO
(for initializing K cluster centroids)
and K-means (for local search ability
to stable the centroids). The results
show a false positive rate of 2.8% and
the detection rate of 86%.
Our
ap-
proach
1st data set for training
(5,240 normal and 530 at-
tack instances), 2nd and
3rd data sets for evaluation
(2,110 normal and 866 at-
tack, and 1,545 normal and
486 attack instances) from
three CCN scenarios
c1=c2=2, w linearly de-
creases by w ∗ Wdamp
(Inertia Weight Damping
Ratio), position and ve-
locity limit by Eqs. (3)
and (4), iteration: 1000,
number of particles: 25
well-separated clusters through
DBI (Eq. (11)) and local opti-
mization through MSE (Eq. (7)).
a fuzzy anomaly detection method
in two phases, training and detection
(section 8). This method leads to
well-separated clusters, high detec-
tion rate, and low false positive rate
at the same time as compared to some
other well-known methods.
only select linearly the best set of parameters but ful-
fill also exploration and exploitation issues. Then, we
propose a fuzzy detection method by the combination
of two distance-based methods as classification and out-
lier. We design this hybrid system over CCNs to find the
optimal number of clusters with high separation from
neighbor clusters and low compactness of local data
points, increase detection rate, and decrease false pos-
itive rate at the same time. Table 1 summarizes the
comparison of applied PSO with K-means in different
domains and with various parameters.
3. Content-Centric Networks (CCNs)
The main idea in the CCN is that, an Interest request
for a content object is routed towards the location of the
content’s origin where it has been published. Any router
or intermediate node on the way checks its cache for
matching copies of the requested content. If a cached
copy of any piece of Interest request is found, it is re-
turned to the requester along the path the request came
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from. On the way back, all the intermediate nodes store
a copy of content in their caches to answer to proba-
ble same Interest requests from subsequent requesters
[41, 42]. CCN routers must include the following com-
ponents:
1. Content Store (CS): a storage space for content
caching and retrieval,
2. Forwarding Interest Base (FIB): a table with name
prefixes and corresponding outgoing interfaces for
routing incoming Interests packets,
3. Pending Interest Table (PIT): a table with the cur-
rently unsatisfied Interests and their corresponding
incoming interfaces.
The following is a list of some of the main security is-
sues in CCN:
1. Architectural Risks: Since contents can be
cached on each CCN router, the caches can jeop-
ardize user privacy, content privacy and perform
cache pollution attacks. Because users leave com-
munication and exchanged data traces in the caches
and content can be extracted by attackers [41, 43,
44]. And since, any attacker can get that informa-
tion from the caches by either using Interest pack-
ets with special query features or by probing the
caches; user’s privacy is very vulnerable [45].
2. DoS attacks: There are new ways to perform DoS
attacks by either making content unreachable for
requests or forcing fake responses [7, 45, 46, 47].
To make content unreachable for requests: a source
can be disrupted by sending large numbers of new
and distinct Interests (Interest Flooding Attacks) or
an attacker can decline the cache performance by
overloading the cache when a cache receives a le-
gal traffic. When attackers get high access control
in a router, they can make disruption in routing by
do not forwarding requests or enforce misbehaving
in Pending Interest Table (PIT) routers in order to
prevent content retrieval. To serve fake responses:
an attacker can make routers believe a valid con-
tent is invalid and reply a ”not valid” response, de-
liberately. A content can also be spoofed by inject-
ing fake responses that are not signed or are signed
with a wrong key, hoping that the user accepts the
response in source. An old content (which may be
unsecured) signed with the right key can be also re-
placed with the original one, or an attacker may get
high access to the source’s signing key to sign con-
tent with the correct key. Another possible threat is
the misbehaving of the distributed directory system
(a digital certificate storage of authority identities)
where a client should query for a digital certificate
of a content provider, e.g., not replying to a query
[27, 48].
4. Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
The PSO was firstly introduced by Kennedy and
Eberhart in 1995 [49]. It was inspired by the social be-
havior of a bird flock or fish school. It is a population
based meta-heuristic method that optimizes a problem
by initializing a flock of birds randomly over the search
space where each bird is referred as a ”particle” and the
population of particles is called ”swarm”. The particles
move iteratively around in the search space according
to a simple mathematical formula over the particle’s po-
sition and velocity to find the global best position. In
the n-dimensional search space, the position and the ve-
locity of i th particle at t th iteration of algorithm is de-
noted by vector Xi(t) = (xi1(t), xi2(t), ..., xin(t)) and vec-
tor Vi(t) = (vi1(t), vi2(t), ..., vin(t)), respectively. This so-
lution is evaluated by a cost function for each particle at
each stage of algorithm to provides a quantitative value
of the solution’s utility. Afterwards, a record of the best
position of each particle based on the cost value is saved.
The best previously visited position of the particle i at
current stage is denoted by vector Pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin)
as the personal bests. During this process, the position
of all the particles that gives the best cost until the cur-
rent stage is also recorded as the global best position
denoted by G = (g1, g2, ..., gn). The structure of the ve-
locity and the position updates is depicted in Fig. 1.
Each iteration is composed of three movements: in the
first movement, particle moves slightly toward the front
in the previous direction with the same speed. In the
second movement, it moves slightly toward the previ-
ous itself best position. Finally, in the third movement,
moves slightly toward the global position. At each iter-
ation, the velocity and the position of each particle are
defined according to Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively:
Vi(t) = ω ∗ Vi(t − 1) + c1ϕ1(Pi − Xi(t − 1))
+c2ϕ2(G − Xi(t − 1)) (1)
Xi(t) = Xi(t − 1) + Vi(t) (2)
Where, ω denotes the nonzero inertia weight factor
that introduces a preference for the particle to continue
moving in the same direction. Decreasing the iner-
tia over time introduces a shift from the exploratory
(global search) to the exploitative (local search) mode
[50, 51]. Generally, the inertia weight ω is reduced lin-
early. There are several selection strategies of inertia
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Figure 1: Description of velocity and position updates
in PSO for a 2-dimensional parameter space
weight ω which have been described in [52, 53]. c1 and
c2 are positive constant (social) parameters called ac-
celeration coefficients which control the maximum step
size between successive iterations. ϕ1 and ϕ2 are two
independently positive random number drawn form a
uniform distribution between 0.0 and 1.0. According
to [51], a good starting point is to set ωstart to 0.9, ωend
to 0.4, and c1 = c2 = 2.
The velocity and position of a particle might end up
positioning the particle beyond the boundary [Varmin,
Varmax] of the search space. Therefore, the need of
having a scheme which can bring such particles back
into the search space. In our proposal, we apply Set On
Boundary strategy. According to this strategy the parti-
cle is reset on the bound of the variable which it exceeds
[54]. Let XC denote a current velocity or position of a
solution, then XC is set to XnewC as follows:
XC → XnewC =

−0.1 ∗ (Varmax − Varmin)
i f XC < lowerbound
0.1 ∗ (Varmax − Varmin)
i f XC > upperbound

(3)
An additional strategy called velocity reflection is also
applied. Velocity reflection allows those particles that
move toward the outside the boundary to move back into
the search space according to Eq. (4).
Vi(t + 1)→ −Vi(t + 1) (4)
5. K-means Clustering Algorithm
The K-means algorithm [23] groups the set of data
points into a predefined number of the clusters in terms
of a distance function. The most widely used method is
Euclidean distance in which a small distance implies a
strong similarity whereas a large distance implies a low
similarity. The Eq. (5) shows the Euclidean distance
calculation between two data points (x and y) with N
objects in a n-dimensional space.
Distance(x, y) =
√√ N∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 (5)
The standard K-means algorithm is summarized as fol-
lows:
1 Randomly initialize the K cluster centroids.
2 Assign each object to the group with the closest
centroid. Euclidean distance measures the mini-
mum distance between data objects and each clus-
ter centroid.
3 Recalculate the cluster centroid vector, using
m j =
1
n j
∑
∀datap∈C j
datap (6)
where, m j denotes the centroid vector of the cluster
j, n j is the number of the data vectors in cluster j,
C j is the subset of the data vectors from cluster j,
and datap denotes the pth data vector.
4 Repeat step 2 until the centroids do not change any
more in the predefined number of iteration or a
maximum number of iterations has been reached.
6. Clustering Problem
Mean Square Error (MSE) is the average pairwise
distance between data points and the corresponding
cluster centroids. Usually distance is Euclidean dis-
tance, but other metrics are also used. Given the set
of cluster centroids (c), the set of corresponding data
points (x), cx denotes the cluster centroid corresponding
to the x, and N is the number of data points, MSE can
be calculated as:
MS E =
1
N
N∑
i=1
d(xi, cx)2 (7)
In order to determine the correct and the optimal num-
ber of clusters, we must choose the validation criteria.
There are several methods (such as K-means) which
try to minimize the MSE between data vectors and
their cluster centroid to verify the clustering goodness
[33, 55]. But, MSE is not enough and suitable met-
ric for determining the number of the clusters, since it
decreases as the number of cluster increases. In fact,
5
Figure 2: Two steps of the proposed fuzzy anomaly detection system in CCN
the optimal MSE would be number of the cluster equals
to data set points, and the MSE=0. Therefore, we ap-
ply Davies Bouldin Index (DBI) [56] as the criterion
since, in our experiments, we have found it quite reliable
among the variety of alternative internal clustering val-
idation metrics; with regard to pointing out the correct
number of clusters. DBI takes into account both com-
pactness (intra-cluster diversity) and separation (inter-
cluster diversity) criteria that makes similar data points
within the same clusters and places other data points in
distinct clusters. The intra-cluster diversity of a cluster
j is calculated as:
MS E j =
1
N
N∑
i=1
d(xi, cx)2 (8)
The inter-cluster distance of the cluster i and j is mea-
sured as the distance between their centroids ci and c j.
According to Eq. (9), the closeness of the two clusters
can be calculated by the sum of their MSE divided by
the distance of their centroids.
Closenessi, j =
MS Ei + MS E j
d(ci, c j)
(9)
Small value of Closenessi, j denotes that the clusters are
separated and a large value denotes that the clusters are
close to each other. To calculate DBI value, the highest
value from Eq. (9) is assigned to cluster as its cluster
similarity:
Closenessi = max(Closenessi, j), i , j (10)
Finally, the overall DBI validity is defined according to
Eq. (11), which the lower DBI value means better clus-
tering result.
DBI =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Closenessi (11)
7. Fuzzy Set
Fuzzy set theory is a method of representing the
vagueness and imprecision which is appropriate for
anomaly detection for two major reasons [57, 58]:
1. The anomaly detection problem involves many nu-
meric attributes in collected audit data and various
derived statistical measurements. Building models
directly on numeric data causes high detection er-
rors, and
2. The security itself involves fuzziness, because the
boundary between the normal and abnormal is not
well defined.
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Fuzzy logic also can work with other popular data min-
ing technique as outlier detection. Since malicious
behavior is naturally different from normal behavior,
abnormal behavior should be considered as outliers
[59, 60]. Fuzzy logic can help to construct more ab-
stract and flexible patterns for intrusion detection and
thus greatly increase the robustness and adaption abil-
ity of detection systems [58]. Hence, fuzzy approach
can reduce the false positive rate with higher reliability
in determining intrusive activities, due to any data (nor-
mal or attack) may be similar (closest distance) to some
clusters.
8. Proposed Fuzzy Anomaly Detection System
This section presents the details of our proposed
method. Proposed fuzzy anomaly detection system con-
sists of two phases: training and detection. Fig. 2
shows the proposed fuzzy anomaly detection system
steps. Each phase is also described as follows.
8.1. Training Phase
The training phase is based on the hybridization of
PSO and K-means clustering algorithm with two si-
multaneous cost functions: well-separated clusters (low
intra-cluster distance and high inter-cluster distance) by
DBI and local optimization by MSE to find the optimal
number of clusters. Before training process, data sam-
ples should be normalized into [0 1], when dealing with
parameters of different units and scales [61, 62]. The
steps of the training phase is presented as follows:
Step 1: Define problem and PSO parameters
1.nVar: number of the cluster centroids, nPop: size
of the population;
2. Define constriction coefficients parameters, c1 =
c2 = 2 and initially w = 1;
3. Define inertia weight damping ratio (Wdamp =
0.99) to linearly decrease w;
4. Define position and velocity limits as Varmax = 1
and Varmin = 0;
5. An initial population is generated based on the
nPop with following parameters:
particle.Position = a m × nVar matrix of random num-
bers generated from the continuous uniform distribu-
tions with lower (Varmin) and upper (Varmax) endpoints.
m denotes size of the data set features;
particle.Cost = calculate the DBI for each particle
based on the generated particle.position;
particle.Velocity = a zero matrix in m × nVar size;
particle.S ol = [], (S ol is a structure of two objective
functions: Cost1 (DBI) and Cost2 (MSE));
particle.Best.Position = [] (keep the personal best of
the position);
particle.Best.Cost = [] (keep the personal best of the
cost);
particle.Best.S ol = [] (keep the personal best of the
S ol);
6. Globalbest = [] (keep the global best of swarm);
7. Repeat the following loop until the target or maxi-
mum iteration is completed:
8. Select Particle(i), i = 1, 2, ..., nPop and run the fol-
lowing PSO algorithm for Particle(i):
8.1. Update velocity by Eq. (1);
8.2. Apply velocity limits by Eq. (3);
8.3. Update position by Eq. (2);
8.4. Velocity mirror effect by Eq. (4);
8.5. Apply position limits by Eq. (3);
8.6. Evaluation of two objective functions, DBI by Eq.
(11) and MSE by Eq. (7);
8.7. Update personal best:
i f (particle(i).Cost == particle(i).Best.Cost) AND
(particle(i).S ol.MS E < particle(i).Best.S ol.MS E)
particle(i).Best.Position = particle(i).Position;
particle(i).Best.S ol = particle(i).S ol;
else i f (particle(i).Cost < particle(i).Best.Cost)
particle(i).Best.Position = particle(i).Position;
particle(i).Best.Cost = particle(i).Cost;
particle(i).Best.S ol = particle(i).S ol;
end
end;
8.8. Update global best:
i f ((particle(i).Best.Cost == GlobalBest.Cost) AND
(particle(i).Best.S ol.MS E < GlobalBest.S ol.MS E))
OR (particle(i).Best.Cost < GlobalBest.Cost)
GlobalBest = particle(i).Best;
end;
9. if i > nPop go to the step 10; otherwise, set i = i+1
and go to the step 8;
10. Update w by w = w ∗Wdamp;
11. If the maximum iteration or predefined target is
not reached, set i = 1 and go to the step 7; Otherwise,
run K-means clustering algorithm by the obtained posi-
tions of cluster centroids from PSO algorithm.
After the main procedure of training phase, each formed
cluster is labeled based on the target (original) classes in
training data set. It is highly probable that the clusters
containing normal data (correct classification) will have
a number of abnormal data (incorrect classification) and
vice versa. Therefore, we assigned a goodness value in
range of [0 1] for each formed cluster by purity metric.
The purity metric determines the frequency of the most
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common category/class into each cluster:
Purity =
1
n
k∑
q=1
max
1≤ j≤l
n jq (12)
Where, n is the total number of samples; l is the number
of categories, n jq is the number of samples in cluster q
that belongs to the original class j(1 ≤ j ≤ l). A large
purity (close to 1) is desired for a good clustering. If the
all samples (data) in a cluster have the same class, the
purity value set to 1 as a pure cluster. This purity metric
(goodness value) is used in the detection phase.
Table 2: The five applied benchmark data sets
Data set No. of features No. of classes No. of patterns
Iris 4 3 150
Glass 9 6 214
Wine 13 3 178
Ionosphere 34 2 351
Zoo 17 7 101
8.2. Detection Phase
The defined optimal placement of cluster centroids
and data objects from training phase are sent to the sec-
ond phase for outlier and anomaly detection when new
monitoring data enter. In the detection phase, a fuzzy
decision approach applied to detect attacks and anoma-
lies. We deploy a combination of two distance-based
methods, i.e., classification and outlier:
1 Classification: The distances between a data ob-
ject and each clusters are calculated using the
goodness value of the cluster × average linkage.
Average linkage approach considers small vari-
ances, because it considers all members in the clus-
ter rather than just a single point. However, it tends
to be less influenced by extreme values than other
distance methods [63]. A data object is classified
as normal if it is closer to the one of the normal
clusters than to the anomalous ones, and vice versa.
This distance-based classification allows detecting
known kind of abnormal or normal traffics with
similar characteristics as in the training data set.
2 Outlier: An outlier (noise) is a data object that dif-
fers considerably from most other objects, which
can be considered as an anomaly. For outlier de-
tection, only the distance to the normal clusters
(obtained from classification phase) is calculated
by goodness value of the closer normal cluster ×
Chebyshev distance. In the Chebyshev distance
(Eq. (13)), distance between two vectors is the
greatest of their differences along any coordinate
dimension. It allows to detect better new anoma-
lies that do not appear in the training data set. Be-
cause it takes into account the maximum value dis-
tance approach between any coordinate dimension
that would lead to become more strict against data
objects measurement.
Dchebyshev(p, c) = max(|pi − ci|) (13)
Where, p is the data object and c is the centroids of the
normal cluster with standard coordinates pi and ci.
The proposed fuzzy detection method consists of two
inputs (classification and outlier), one output, and four
main parts: fuzzification, rules, inference engine, and
defuzzification. In fuzzification step, a crisp set of in-
put data are converted to a fuzzy set using fuzzy lin-
guistic terms and membership functions. In step 2, we
construct rule base. Afterwards, an inference is made
and combined based on a set of rules. In the defuzzi-
fication step, the results of fuzzy output are mapped to
a crisp (non-fuzzy) output using the membership func-
tions. Finally, if the crisp output is bigger than a pre-
defined threshold, an object is considered as an abnor-
mal instance; otherwise, an object is a normal instance.
This fuzzy approach can improve our performance cri-
teria (high detection rate and low false positive rate at
the same time) as compared to a non-fuzzy approach.
9. Experimental Results and Discussion
9.1. Performance Measurement
We compared and evaluated the training phase of our
proposed method with standalone PSO and K-means al-
gorithms as well as preexisting methods from the lit-
erature as [36], [37], [38], [39], and [40] which used
different parameters and cost functions. We also em-
ployed both MSE and DBI criteria on all evaluations. In
order to evaluate the performance of each method, we
use the Detection Rate (DR), False Positive Rate (FPR)
and F-measure criteria. The detection rate is the num-
ber of intrusions detected by the system from Eq. (14),
the false positive rate is the number of normal traffics
that was incorrectly classified as intrusion from Eq. (15)
and F-measure is the weighted harmonic mean of pre-
cision (positive predictive value) and recall (detection
rate) from Eq. (17).
DR (Recall) =
TruePositive
TruePositive + FalseNegative
(14)
FPR =
FalsePositive
FalsePositive + TrueNegative
(15)
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Table 3: Classification error (%) for our proposed method and applied methods
Method Type Criteria Data set
Iris Glass Wine Ionosphere Zoo
K-means
Training Ave. 6.86 19.54 18.2 11.64 10.83S.D. 2.34 3.61 3.66 3.28 2.73
Test Ave. 5.53 17.59 18.26 11.12 9.42S.D. 2.32 3.12 3.76 3.1 2.6
PSO (MSE)
Training Ave. 5.42 17.41 17.8 10.66 10.35S.D. 2.14 3.08 3.01 2.86 2.73
Test Ave. 4.84 16.41 16.81 9.59 9.64S.D. 2.24 3.3 2.98 2.78 2.2
PSO (DBI, MSE)
Training Ave. 4.9 16.85 17.46 10.75 9.98S.D. 1.73 3.01 2.56 3.14 2.48
Test Ave. 4.59 16.08 16.41 9.17 8.64S.D. 1.62 2.85 2.41 2.72 2.6
PSO-Kmeans (MSE)
Training Ave. 5.1 16.89 17.54 11.94 11.4S.D. 1.23 3.08 3.56 2.91 2.55
Test Ave. 4.77 16.81 17.48 9.96 9.35S.D. 1.26 3.1 3.26 2.78 2.6
Method [36]
Training Ave. 4.87 16.32 15.24 11.16 8.58S.D. 1.28 3.32 3.4 2.48 2.4
Test Ave. 5.4 16.07 15.08 9.92 8.06S.D. 1.4 3.63 2.92 2.39 2.02
Method [37]
Training Ave. 5.92 16.54 16.34 10.42 10.03S.D. 1.35 3.47 3.4 3.36 3.3
Test Ave. 5.76 16.43 15.6 9.88 10.05S.D. 1.5 3.51 3.04 2.68 2.75
Method [38]
Training Ave. 5.84 18.72 16.98 12.24 11.52S.D. 1.34 3.78 3.3 3.79 3.17
Test Ave. 5.48 17.18 15.82 11.86 9.56S.D. 1.32 3.61 2.98 3.61 3.25
Method [39]
Training Ave. 6.01 18.59 17.65 10.45 9.31S.D. 1.97 4.54 4.76 4.87 5.01
Test Ave. 5.98 17.64 16.16 11.06 9.11S.D. 1.75 4.85 5.02 4.85 3.97
Method [40]
Training Ave. 4.91 16.29 15.62 11.18 9.49S.D. 1.23 3.33 3.9 2.98 2.35
Test Ave. 4.52 16.18 15.14 10.22 8.09S.D. 1.38 3.11 3.01 2.84 2.23
Our Method
PSO-Kmeans (DBI, MSE)
Training Ave. 4.01 14.44 14.88 10.04 7.98S.D. 1.03 2.29 2.16 2.31 2.11
Test Ave. 3.58 13.14 13.04 9.03 7.47S.D. 0.98 2.12 2.01 2.26 1.88
Precision =
TruePositive
TruePositive + FalsePositive
(16)
F − measure = 2 × Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall
(17)
True negative and true positive correspond to a correct
operating of the system when traffics are successfully
predicted as normal and attacks, respectively. False pos-
itive refers to normal traffics when are predicted as at-
tack, and false negative is attack traffic when incorrectly
predicted as normal traffic.
9.2. Benchmarking the proposed method
To assess the robustness and accuracy of our pro-
posed method, we applied the five classic benchmark
problems from the UCI machine learning repository
[64]. Table 2 shows the main characteristics of these
data sets. Our proposed method and the other methods
mentioned in section 9.1 have been employed to these
problems. All experiments were run 20 times, and the
average classification error (Ave.) and its standard devi-
ation (S.D.) were computed. In the experiments, 70% of
data set is used as training data set in the training phase
and the rest is considered as testing data set in the de-
tection phase in order to validate the functionality of the
proposed method. We assume that the normal clusters
denote the correct classification and abnormal (attack)
clusters denote the incorrect classification. For instance,
given a data object d in a test data set belongings to class
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Table 4: Comparison of our proposed method with some other methods
K Criteria Kmeans PSO
(MSE)
PSO
(DBI,
MSE)
PSO-
Kmeans
(MSE)
Method
[36]
Method
[37]
Method
[38]
Method
[39]
Method
[40]
Our Method
PSO-Kmeans
(DBI, MSE)
50
Correct K 12 10 10 14 15 15 17 18 18 10
DR (%) 56.18 68.18 77.11 69.12 71.12 73.92 76.55 74.65 73.12 80.22
FPR (%) 9.19 5.22 7.33 13.157 12.05 12.15 9.43 9.96 8.12 3.489
F-measure (%) 67.81 78.62 83.58 75.77 77.6 79.4 82.7 83.11 80.65 87.32
75
Correct K 15 12 10 15 15 14 18 18 16 14
DR (%) 47.24 68.18 77.11 61.05 63.5 72.14 66.55 65.78 74.12 80.22
FPR (%) 9.338 4.28 3.704 3.122 9.287 13.165 4.32 5.03 9.12 3.489
F-measure (%) 60.31 79.05 85.28 74.36 76.15 77.81 77.87 76.84 80.85 87.32
100
Correct K 15 15 14 15 16 17 20 19 16 14
DR (%) 47.24 68.18 77.11 67.145 64.5 72.14 76.55 75.83 76.12 80.22
FPR (%) 8.558 6.431 7.839 7.819 7.182 12.314 8.12 9.12 12.8 3.489
F-measure (%) 60.61 78.06 83.35 76.72 75.11 78.17 82.85 80.68 80.52 87.32
125
Correct K 17 10 15 18 18 15 21 21 17 11
DR (%) 56.18 68.18 77.11 65.123 66.5 72.14 66.55 67.89 77.12 80.22
FPR (%) 4.738 4.102 3.505 3.935 8.134 9.637 2.98 3.78 10.023 3.489
F-measure (%) 69.81 79.31 85.37 77.02 76.12 79.33 78.5 78.95 82.38 87.32
150
Correct K 11 14 16 13 14 14 15 16 17 16
DR (%) 42.93 68.18 77.11 71.147 71.119 72.14 76.55 77.93 77.14 80.22
FPR (%) 3.738 1.345 1.345 2.101 5.98 12.508 8.88 7.64 12.209 1.314
F-measure (%) 58.53 80.43 86.41 82.12 80.28 78.09 82.51 85.89 81.43 88.38
175
Correct K 22 22 20 21 25 31 30 32 17 20
DR (%) 71.903 68.18 77.11 70.548 72.119 83.34 78.95 76.89 77.06 80.22
FPR (%) 4.489 3.13 3.002 2.44 3.98 15.98 14.14 13.54 3.096 2.738
F-measure (%) 81.51 79.58 85.61 81.55 81.88 83.55 81.71 82.48 85.53 87.68
200
Correct K 16 18 18 19 22 21 20 19 20 18
DR (%) 64.24 71.11 77.11 74.343 72.119 73.34 72.95 74.35 81.66 80.22
FPR (%) 2.738 3.002 1.376 2.739 9.98 12.436 12.15 13.14 14.096 1.314
F-measure (%) 76.81 81.67 88.71 83.95 79.16 78.9 78.76 80.32 83.37 88.38
250
Correct K 16 17 15 19 19 16 21 18 18 15
DR (%) 64.24 70.34 77.11 71.01 82.119 72.245 75.95 79.45 72.66 80.22
FPR (%) 2.738 2.013 3.91 4.11 15.95 5.86 1.16 3.12 3.101 2.738
F-measure (%) 76.81 81.61 85.18 81.08 82.85 81.1 85.74 86.83 82.66 87.7
300
Correct K 21 20 14 20 21 18 18 19 17 14
DR (%) 74.82 88.27 99 88.132 81.44 89.911 90.106 88.34 94.109 100
FPR (%) 10.314 9.12 17.352 9.19 11.209 17.33 24.51 26.93 16.91 9.117
F-measure (%) 80.74 89.36 91.44 89.28 84.5 86.59 83.86 81.14 88.71 95.64
350
Correct K 21 25 26 22 23 23 26 25 20 26
DR (%) 77.22 90.122 99 88.668 88.44 95.22 92.20 93.67 97.109 100
FPR (%) 12.38 16.981 9.676 10.254 9.209 9.164 12.12 11.39 7.454 6.809
F-measure (%) 81.4 86.96 94.84 89.1 89.45 93.13 90.19 90.83 94.91 96.71
400
Correct K 16 21 25 19 21 28 28 26 27 27
DR (%) 77.22 90.122 99 92.55 95.29 94.005 96.20 94.23 97.077 100
FPR (%) 12.38 16.981 17.998 10.45 6.45 15.45 13.12 14.67 14.968 1.847
F-measure (%) 81.37 86.95 90.89 91.21 94.64 89.82 91.92 88.45 91.76 98.99
500
Correct K 23 24 21 22 25 31 33 33 27 21
DR (%) 77.22 90.122 99 96.68 94.29 96.005 96.78 96.15 96.807 100
FPR (%) 12.738 7.672 19.368 8.018 16.45 17.45 17.94 17.63 12.216 12.379
F-measure (%) 81.25 91.09 90.59 94.43 89.42 89.88 90.01 90.03 92.54 94.17
A. If it gets assigned to class B by the proposed classifi-
cation method in the second phase, class B is an incor-
rect class/category for data object d. Hereby, the formed
cluster belongings to class B is assumed to be an abnor-
mal cluster for the data object d. In contrast, if data ob-
ject d is closer to a cluster labeled class A (we called
it normal cluster), the outlier distance should be cal-
culated. Then, according to the detection/classification
phase of the proposed method, both classification and
outlier values are sent to the fuzzy module. If the crisp
output is smaller than the predefined threshold, data
object d seems normal instance (correct classification);
otherwise, it seems anomalous instance (incorrect clas-
sification). The results have been summarized in Table
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Figure 3: The sample solution area (fuzzy inference) of proposed fuzzy detection system
3. It can be seen in the table that our proposed fuzzy
method tends to obtain a more accurate classification
rate (Ave.) and lower standard deviation (S.D.) as com-
pared to other methods.
9.3. Feature Construction
We employed simple features that can be extracted
by inspecting the headers of the network packets. These
intrinsic features are the duration of the connection,
source host, destination host, source interface, and des-
tination interface [65]. We also used the following fea-
tures in each 2 seconds time interval:
1 Total number of packets sent from and to the given
interface in the considered time interval,
2 Total number of bytes sent from and to the given
interface in the considered time interval, and
3 Number of different source-destination pairs
matching the given hostname-interface that being
observed in the considered time interval.
The motivation of the first two features is that the num-
ber of packets and bytes allow to detect anomalies in
traffic volume, and the third feature allows to detect
network and interface scans as well as distributed at-
tacks, which both result in increased number of source-
destination pairs [66].
9.4. Training Phase
Since there is no reference data for content-centric
networks as well as real Internet traffic, we used the
Table 5: CCNx Traffic Generation
Type of traffic Applied tools
Normal
(5240 records)
(1) ccnsendchunks with ccncatchunks2
(2) ccnputfile with ccngetfile
(3) ccnchat
Attack
(530 records)
(1) ccndsmoketest for (distributed) Interest flood-
ing attack
(2) make abnormal traffics to saturate channels
by sending very small contents (decreasing buffer
size) from owner of origin, called Abnormal
Source Behavior
(3) do not forward contents deliberately to re-
quester(s), called Abnormal Unreachable Content
Behavior
Table 6: Rules Matrix
Outlier Classification (Cls.)
Very
close
Close Average Far Very far
Close Normal Normal Normal Low
prone
Low
prone
Average Low
prone
Low
prone
High
prone
High
prone
High
prone
Far High
prone
High
prone
Abnormal Abnormal Abnormal
CCNx software of PARC (www.ccnx.org) to run a sce-
nario for generating of CCN traffics in a local testbed.
This local testbed includes 13 Linux (Ubuntu) ma-
chines, three of them acting as servers (content ori-
gins) and the other ones as clients. Then, we ran wire-
shark tool to capture CCNx packets. We performed the
following experiments with the main tools in CCNx:
ccnsendchunks (to upload objects/files into the CCN
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repository), ccncatchunks2 (to receive desired contents
and to write them to stdout), ccnputfile (to publish a lo-
cal file in the CCNx repository), ccngetfile (to retrieve
published content and writes it to the local file), cc-
ndsmoketest (to send the large number of Interests -
Interest flooding attacks- toward a host/network), and
ccnchat (to run a chat channel). We conducted three
attack instances for both training and detection phases
including Interest flooding attacks, flooding a victim
router by sending too many small contents from owner
of origin content (we called it Abnormal Source Behav-
ior) and making content unreachable for requesters (we
called it Abnormal Unreachable Content Behavior). We
also carried out an anomaly instance in the detection
phase as serving fake response (we called it Abnormal
Forwarder Capacity Behavior) which does not appear
in the training data set. The structure of the generated
traffics are shown in Table 5 for training and Tables 8
and 9 for testing data sets.
For the PSO algorithm, we used swarm size of 25 parti-
cles, the number of iterations set to 1000, and other pa-
rameters set according to subsection 8.1. The proposed
hybrid method was implemented by the MATLAB soft-
ware on an Intel Pentium 2.13 GHz CPU, 4 GB RAM
running Windows 7 Ultimate.
Table 7: Some fuzzy rules in proposed fuzzy system
IF Cls.=Average and Outlier=Close THEN Alarm=Normal
IF Cls.=Close and Outlier=Average THEN Alarm=LowProne
IF Cls.=High and Outlier=Average THEN Alarm=HighProne
IF Cls.=Very far and Outlier=Far THEN Alarm=Abnormal
9.5. Detection Phase
We use MATLAB fuzzy logic toolbox for fuzzy rule
based intrusion detection. The detection phase is struc-
tured with the following components:
1 Two fuzzy set of input variables: Classification and
Outlier;
classification membership: Very Close, Close, Av-
erage, Far, Very Far; outlier membership: Close,
Average, Far.
2 A fuzzy set of output variable: Alarm; alarm mem-
bership: Normal, Less Prone, High Prone, Abnor-
mal.
3 Fuzzy membership functions: see section 9.7.
4 Fuzzy rules: 15 rules (Tables 6 and 7).
5 Inference: Mamdani fuzzy inference by fuzzy set
operations as max and min for OR and AND, re-
spectively.
6 Defuzzifier: Center of Gravity algorithm:
Center o f Gravity =
∫ max
min u µ(u) d(u)∫ max
min µ(u) d(u)
(18)
Where, u denotes the output variable, µ is the mem-
bership function after accumulation, and min and
max are lower and upper limit for defuzzification,
respectively.
A sample solution area (fuzzy inference) of proposed
fuzzy detection phase is given in Fig. 3.
Table 8: First scenario of CCNx traffic
Type of traffic Applied tools
Normal
(2110 records)
(1) HttpProxy application to run a HTTP proxy
that converts HTTP Gets to CCN data.
(2) ccnputfile with ccngetfile
(3) ccnchat
Attack
(866 records)
(1) ccndsmoketest for Interest flooding attack
(2) Abnormal Source Behavior
(3) make capacity limitation in count of content
objects by forwarder/router to discard cached con-
tent objects deliberately as Abnormal Forwarder
Capacity Behavior
Table 9: Second scenario of CCNx traffic
Type of traffic Applied tools
Normal
(1545 records)
(1) ccnsendchunks with ccncatchunks2
(2) ccnputfile with ccngetfile
(3) HttpProxy application
Attack
(492 records)
(1) Abnormal Source Behavior
(2) Abnormal Unreachable Content Behavior
(3) Abnormal Forwarder Capacity Behavior
9.6. Results of Training Phase
In this section, the performance of proposed method
and preexisting methods from the literature are com-
pared. Since null clusters might appear in the results,
these clusters are removed and we count the correct
number of K. The experiments on each method were
repeated 10 times independently with several K values.
The results are summarized in Table 4. The proposed
method outperforms other preexisting methods in terms
of the DR, the FPR and the F-measure at the same time.
The PSO (DBI and MSE) could satisfy DR by 99%
when initial K is between 300 and 500. However, it
could not satisfy a suitable FPR. By the hybridization of
K-means algorithm and PSO (DBI and MSE), we could
gain suitable results by very low FPR and very high DR
at the same time. In contrast, none of other methods
meet very high DR and very low FPR at the same time.
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Figure 4: 1st cost function (DBI) in 1000 iterations
Figure 5: 2nd cost function (MSE) in 1000 iterations
According to the Table 4, by increasing of initial pa-
rameter K, results are more efficient with the optimal
number of clusters, high detection rate, low false posi-
tive rate and greater F-measure at the same time.
The results clearly show that our proposed method
offers the best optimized solution in comparison
with the other methods when K=400 by DR=100%,
FPR=1.847%, F-measure=98.99% and the correct
number of K=27. We show the fluctuation of variations
of two cost functions during the training phase in Figs. 4
and 5. The results clearly show that by changing of clus-
tering values based on DBI, MSE changes in a irregular
manner through the different iterations. For instance, in
the last iteration, the minimum MSE is 8.391, but the
Figure 6: The best cost (DBI) of four clustering results
Figure 7: The MSE value of four clustering results
lowest MSE is in iteration 915 by 8.3458. When DBI is
decreasing to find optimal clustering results in the itera-
tions between 100 and 800, there are many fluctuations
for MSE value. We also show the trend of changes of
DBI and MSE values during the training phase when
the DR was 100% and K is between 300 and 500 (Figs.
6 and 7). According to Fig. 6, the best and the worst
procedure of reducing the DBI value are for K=300 and
400, respectively. In contrast, the best and the worst
procedure of reducing the MSE value are for K=500
and 300 as shown in Fig. 7. The best DBI value for
K=300 led to the worst value in MSE. Moreover, the
highest changes for minimizing the two applied cost
functions during the training phase are for K=400 and
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500. These results verify that the MSE parameter cannot
be singly used as a good performance criterion for find-
ing the optimal placement of clusters centroids and data
objects. We send the optimal outcomes from our pro-
posed method (DR = 100%, FPR = 1.847%, F-measure
= 89.99% and K = 27) and the best combination of the
DR, the FPR and the F-measure from other methods to
the second phase for fuzzy anomaly detection.
9.7. Results of Detection Phase
In order to obtain results on how the proposed fuzzy
anomaly detection system can perform in real scenar-
ios, we applied it to packet traces recorded at two sce-
narios with 17 Linux machines (10 clients, 4 servers,
and 3 routers). These traces are from CCNx data repos-
itory of the University of Politecnica Catalunya (UPC)
which are shown in Tables 8 and 9. Each trace file con-
tains about 20 minutes of monitored traffic. Accord-
ing to Tables 8 and 9, there is a new type of normal
traffic (HttpProxy) and a new type of anomaly traffic
(Abnormal Forwarder Capacity Behavior) which have
not appeared in the training data set. We also define a
threshold as dthreshold=0.5. Each new monitored CCN
packet is sent as input to the fuzzy detection phase in
order to detect attacks and anomalies. According to
the proposed fuzzy anomaly detection system (section
8.2), we calculate the classification distance to find the
nearest cluster. If the distance is closer to one of the
normal clusters, we calculate the outlier. If the out-
lier outcome is bigger than a predefined threshold, the
packet is treated as an anomaly. In contrast, if the clas-
sification distance is closer to one of the attack clus-
ters, it gets treated as an attack packet. Based on the
different fuzzy membership functions, the fuzzy detec-
tion method produces different results. To find the most
ideal system, we apply seven membership functions for
each applied methods including trapmf (Trapezoidal-
shaped), dsigmf (Difference between two sigmoidal
functions), trimf (Triangular-shaped), psigmf (Product
of two sigmoidal), gauss2mf (Gaussian combination),
gbellmf (Generalized bell-shaped), and gaussmf (Gaus-
sian curve). Fig. 8 illustrates the applied membership
functions. We integrated each method by optimal results
gained from the training phase (Table 4) with our pro-
posed fuzzy detection method in the second phase. Af-
terwards, we compare the performance of each method
based on the RMSE, minimum and maximum error be-
tween target output and predicted output. The compar-
ison results between methods in two applied data sets
(Tables 8 and 9) are summarized in Table 10. We found
out that the RMSE between target and predicted output
is absolutely different. We marked the three best results
for each membership function. The most appropriate re-
sults based on the RMSE, minimum and maximum er-
ror include our proposed method (PSO-Kmeans (DBI,
MSE)), PSO (DBI, MSE), methods [36] and [40], re-
spectively. By the integration of DBI (well-separated
cost) and MSE (local optimization cost), PSO could
considerably improve the results in detection phase. As
shown, our proposed method is very well suited for
most of the membership functions based on the less
RMSE, minimum and maximum error values. Perfor-
mance of trapmf and gauss2mf MF in our proposed
method are better than other MF and applied methods.
For anomaly detection performance measurement, we
continue our experiment by applying well-performing
and preexisting methods from Table 10 on the afore-
mentioned data sets. The performance of fuzzy detec-
tion approach is also compared with the non-fuzzy ap-
proach. In order to validate the CCNx traffic classifi-
cation performance of our fuzzy detector, we use the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve analy-
sis, Area Under the Curve (AUC), accuracy, specificity
and sensitivity (recall). The ROC curve provides a way
to visually represent how the trade-off between false
positive and detection rate varies for different values of
the detection threshold [67]. The AUC summarizes the
classification performance of the classifier in the range
[0 1] in which the higher the AUC, the easier to distin-
guish attacks from normal traffic [68]. The other applied
performance measures can be summarized as a 2 × 2 ta-
ble (confusion matrix in table 11):
1. Accuracy: (a + d)/(a + b + c + d)
2. Specificity (true negative rate): a/(a + b)
3. Sensitivity (recall): d/(c + d)
Table 11: The 2 × 2 contingency table (confusion ma-
trix)
True label Predicted label
Negative Positive
Negative a b
Positive c d
Figs. 9 and 10 present the fuzzy and non-fuzzy ROC
curves of our proposed method and the other applied
methods for 1st scenario. Figs. 11 and 12 present the
ROC curve for both fuzzy and non-fuzzy approaches in
2nd scenario. As it can be seen in these figures, the de-
tection rate and the false positive rate of our proposed
method (PSO-Kmeans (DBI, MSE)) are better than in
the other methods. This implies a higher number of
the correct detection and a lower number of the false
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(a) Classiﬁcation (trapmf) (b) Outlier (trapmf) (c) Alarm (trapmf)
(d) Classiﬁcation (dsigmf) (e) Outlier (dsigmf) (f) Alarm (dsigmf)
(g) Classiﬁcation (trimf) (h) Outlier (trimf) (i) Alarm (trimf)
(j) Classiﬁcation (psigmf) (k) Outlier (psigmf) (l) Alarm (psigmf)
(m) Classiﬁcation (gauss2mf) (n) Outlier (gauss2mf) (o) Alarm (gauss2mf)
(p) Classiﬁcation (gbellmf) (q) Outlier (gbellmf) (r) Alarm (gbellmf)
(s) Classiﬁcation (gaussmf) (t) Outlier (gaussmf) (u) Alarm (gaussmf)
Figure 8: Seven applied membership functions in detection phase (two inputs and one output)
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Table 10: Comparison of membership functions for fuzzy anomaly detection purposes
Methods Data set Criteria trapmf dsigmf trimf psigmf gauss2mf gbellmf gaussmf
K-means
Table 8
RMSE 0.1037 0.2397 0.2713 0.2268 0.3039 0.1943 0.1949
Min error -0.253 -0.2992 -0.2216 -0.9755 -1.5892 -1.058 -0.4240
Max error 0.8934 0.8635 0.995 0.9334 1.0023 0.9683 0.9875
Table 9
RMSE 0.0663 0.1596 0.1211 0.1238 0.2202 0.2703 0.2009
Min error -0.8817 -0.2088 -0.432 -0.3606 -1.1779 -0.4503 -0.6663
Max error 0.9994 0.935 0.6265 0.3563 0.9966 0.9880 1.008
PSO (MSE)
Table 8
RMSE 0.0759 0.092 0.103 0.1162 0.0953 0.1046 0.0865
Min error -0.2625 -0.7765 -0.3011 -0.727 -0.6035 -0.6303 -0.6541
Max error 0.4862 0.7926 0.4364 0.9918 0.3987 0.8653 0.8337
Table 9
RMSE 0.1295 0.1592 0.2129 0.2604 0.1665 0.1785 0.1728
Min error -0.9444 -0.2385 -0.2004 -1.0268 -0.3541 -1.2154 -0.4445
Max error 0.8943 0.8267 1.0337 0.9501 0.8683 0.4131 0.9616
PSO (DBI, MSE)
Table 8
RMSE 0.6525 0.1817 0.1541 0.1432 0.2024 0.0723 0.1587
Min error -0.7457 -0.276 -0.6548 -0.4627 -0.2643 -0.584 -0.9233
Max error 0.937 0.8859 0.4301 0.9398 0.9489 0.5771 0.8303
Table 9
RMSE 0.0524 0.0892 0.1251 0.1225 0.0669 0.25 0.0925
Min error -0.5833 -0.5382 -0.7248 -0.2865 -0.6324 -0.9254 -0.4052
Max error 0.6592 0.8299 0.9487 0.7618 0.5671 0.9618 0.8465
PSO-Kmeans (MSE)
Table 8
RMSE 0.1096 0.1381 0.2582 0.2608 0.3255 0.1737 0.1931
Min error -0.5418 -0.2839 -0.3055 -1.173 -1.0158 -0.1510 0.8461
Max error 0.854 0.9903 1.1168 0.915 0.9992 0.9425 0.8425
Table 9
RMSE 0.2002 0.1597 0.0979 0.1466 0.2331 0.2647 0.168
Min error -1.1255 -1.1157 -0.5717 -1.3077 -1.005 -0.198 -0.4575
Max error 0.9525 0.6084 0.5921 0.1089 0.998 1.043 0.9459
Method [36]
Table 8
RMSE 0.0927 0.1093 0.0722 0.1135 0.0935 0.0763 0.0581
Min error -0.3177 -0.5658 -0.3461 -0.5126 -0.092 -0.6623 -0.6063
Max error 0.4688 0.8788 0.8808 0.8765 1.003 0.5867 0.6139
Table 9
RMSE 0.1156 0.3435 0.1826 0.2317 0.2817 0.23 0.2393
Min error -0.5278 -0.6531 -0.8078 -0.982 -0.9648 -0.1718 -0.565
Max error 0.8821 0.9217 0.7279 0.825 1.0119 0.9886 1.032
Method [37]
Table 8
RMSE 0.1507 0.2584 0.1868 0.2916 0.2523 0.1115 0.2968
Min error -0.4221 -0.6492 -0.8722 -0.3394 -1.074 -0.4625 -1.038
Max error 0.9439 0.7947 0.78 0.836 1.008 0.3892 0.9654
Table 9
RMSE 0.1919 0.2442 0.0971 0.1749 0.1374 0.1288 0.1163
Min error -0.2277 -0.6492 -0.3084 -0.5541 -0.6253 -0.7965 -0.3109
Max error 1.0243 0.8691 0.8129 0.8973 0.9699 0.9148 0.8623
Method [38]
Table 8
RMSE 0.0917 0.1971 0.2805 0.2059 0.2891 0.1737 0.1568
Min error -0.5883 -0.494 -0.9252 -0.7737 -0.8936 -0.9185 -0.6149
Max error 0.7866 0.9858 0.9913 1.4086 1.479 1.007 0.6044
Table 9
RMSE 0.1749 0.13 0.2525 0.1282 0.2481 0.209 0.1788
Min error -0.5433 -0.5966 -0.6027 -0.3625 -0.9461 -1.139 -0.902
Max error 0.9719 0.4311 0.7168 1.0516 1.085 1.005 0.391
Method [39]
Table 8
RMSE 0.0921 0.201 0.2612 0.2112 0.2761 0.1872 0.1691
Min error -0.593 -0.5143 -0.8982 -0.8754 -0.9012 -0.9218 -0.6241
Max error 0.7957 0.9936 0.9984 1.4148 1.502 1.019 0.6502
Table 9
RMSE 0.1791 0.1256 0.2485 0.1432 0.2516 0.215 0.1889
Min error -0.5553 -0.6041 -0.6081 -0.3702 -0.9333 -1.114 -0.924
Max error 0.9784 0.4394 0.7221 1.0464 1.094 1.055 0.403
Method [40]
Table 8
RMSE 0.1442 0.0948 0.1206 0.0811 0.0961 0.0848 0.1106
Min error -0.3528 -0.5687 -0.6512 -0.5823 -0.209 -0.5186 -0.3415
Max error 1.0159 0.872 0.556 0.7106 0.8354 0.8223 0.8651
Table 9
RMSE 0.2885 0.1871 0.2245 0.2043 0.1849 0.1968 0.3799
Min error -1.391 -1.005 -0.8121 -1.1521 -0.803 -0.2025 -1.3634
Max error 1.0382 0.805 1.0565 0.4807 0.9676 0.9299 0.8228
Our Method
Table 8
RMSE 0.0617 0.2525 0.1191 0.0653 0.0664 0.1176 0.3219
Min error -0.4157 -1.0143 -1.0819 -0.5434 -0.581 -0.3657 -1.0182
Max error 0.6002 0.9994 0.6676 0.5124 0.4562 0.8798 1.003
Table 9
RMSE 0.0531 0.0738 0.0691 0.2165 0.0657 0.1491 0.0519
Min error -0.5215 -0.5281 -0.671 -0.5261 -0.5759 -0.7349 -0.5331
Max error 0.5208 0.5365 0.488 0.8954 0.6468 0.8061 0.5982
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Figure 9: ROC curves corresponding to the proposed
method and other applied methods for 1st scenario
(fuzzy approach)
Figure 10: ROC curves corresponding to the proposed
method and other applied methods for 1st scenario (non-
fuzzy approach)
positives. Table 12 shows the results of fuzzy and non-
fuzzy (crisp) anomaly detection for two applied testing
data sets. As shown in this table, our proposed method
classifies data objects better than the other approaches
based on AUC, accuracy, sensitivity and specificity. In
addition, the non-fuzzy anomaly detection approach is
often not sufficient in detecting many types of attacks as
compared to a fuzzy detection method.
9.8. Computational Order
The computational order of standard PSO algorithm
is O(I ·S ·Cost), where I is the required generation num-
ber, S is the population size, and Cost is the cost func-
tion. The computational complexity of evaluating the
cost function depends on the particular cost function un-
der consideration. The applied cost functions in preex-
Figure 11: ROC curves corresponding to the proposed
method and other applied methods for 2nd scenario
(fuzzy approach)
Figure 12: ROC curves corresponding to the proposed
method and other applied methods for 2nd scenario
(non-fuzzy approach)
isting methods ([36, 37, 38, 39, 40]) are O(N ·K), where
N is the number of data samples and K is the number
of clusters. The computational order of K-means algo-
rithm is O(T ·N ·K), where T is the number of iterations.
The computational order of proposed training method
and preexisting methods from the literature are shown
in Table 13.
9.8.1. Time Complexity
We compare the computational time of algorithms
on the training data set. Table 14 shows the compu-
tational time and the times of increment on computa-
tional time of the six methods. Table 14 demonstrates
that the proposed method (PSO+Kmeans (DBI, MSE))
seems to be less time consuming than the other meth-
ods except methods [38] and [39] due to the application
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Table 12: fuzzy (non-fuzzy) anomaly detection for two applied testing data sets
Method AUC Accuracy Sensitivity (recall) Specificity
mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D.
Data set 1: Table 8
Our Method 97.44 94.48 0.97 96.88 1.54 95.52 0.79
(93.26) (89.07) (2.35) (90.15) (1.41) (93.51) (1.02)
PSO (DBI, MSE) 95.36 91.38 1.34 91.02 2.45 94.18 1.51
(91.41) (87.3) (2.48) (89.15) (2.03) (91.12) (1.29)
Method [40] 92.39 89.61 2.73 89.2 2.83 91.4 1.28
(89.87) (81.74) (3.9) (82.76) (2.97) (88.4) (1.37)
Method [36] 91.92 88.18 2.84 88.21 2.89 90.98 1.94
(87.37) (81.64) (3.71) (83.33) (3.7) (87.73) (1.17)
Method [37] 91.37 89.29 2.98 87.07 3.04 90.11 2.08
(87.14) (81.18) (3.88) (82.13) (3.57) (87.61) (2.21)
Method [38] 90.87 88.63 3.02 87.1 3.12 90.01 2.18
(86.78) (80.51) (3.76) (82.21) (3.85) (87.15) (2.4)
Method [39] 89.4 87.74 3.01 86.63 3.31 89.41 2.15
(86.12) (80.2) (3.58) (81.68) (3.72) (87.05) (2.31)
Data set 2: Table 9
Our Method 97.41 94.45 0.99 97.65 0.67 96.7 0.99
(92.29) (88.14) (2.84) (89.15) (2.03) (91.57) (1.36)
PSO (DBI, MSE) 95.91 92.01 1.01 93.81 1.43 94.93 1.8
(90.98) (86.8) (2.68) (88.18) (3.96) (90.3) (1.39)
Method [40] 92.92 89.84 2.83 88.49 2.19 91.58 1.74
(88.64) (81.06) (3.49) (82.3) (3.19) (86.32) (1.83)
Method [36] 92.18 89.14 2.78 87.3 0.75 90.43 1.14
(86.67) (80.19) (3.9) (81.82) (3.09) (85.55) (1.98)
Method [37] 91.71 87.11 2.74 87.21 0.8 90.1 1.22
(86.11) (80.1) (3.99) (81.9) (3.18) (85.33) (2.05)
Method [38] 91.47 86.98 2.86 87.17 0.91 90.02 1.34
(85.61) (80.06) (3.92) (81.76) (3.41) (85.3) (2.03)
Method [39] 90.08 85.49 3.03 86.66 1.03 89.43 1.53
(85.86) (80.01) (3.99) (80.54) (3.68) (85.11) (2.61)
Table 13: The computational order of the six methods
Methods Cost function Algorithm
Our Method O(MS E) + O(DBI) = O(N · K) + O(K2) O(PS O) + O(K − means)
Method [40] O(MS E) = O(N · K) O(PS O) × O(K − means)
Method [36] O(MS E) = O(N · K) O(PS O) × O(K − means)
Method [37] O(MS E) = O(N · K) O(PS O) × O(K − means)
Method [38] O(MS E) = O(N · K) O(PS O) + O(K − means)
Method [39] O(MS E) = O(N · K) O(PS O) + O(K − means)
of a single cost function. But the proposed method can
find the better solution with less times of increment on
computational time than the other five methods due to
its fast convergence speed. The results show that the
proposed method with the new strategy of cost func-
tion -application of two simultaneous cost functions-
can yield high accuracy as compared to other methods
without very much computational cost.
9.9. Discussion
In this paper, a fuzzy anomaly detection system has
been proposed for content-centric networks. This sys-
tem applies a new hybrid approach with PSO and K-
means in two phases: training and detection (Fig. 2). In
Table 14: The computational time of the six methods
Methods Computational time(sec)
Increment time
(sec)
Our Method 791.412 92.381
Method [40] 1348.297 478.146
Method [36] 1203.459 401.678
Method [37] 1301.763 424.829
Method [38] 711.359 207.412
Method [39] 723.286 289.764
the training phase, we propose an hybridization of Parti-
cle Swarm Optimization (PSO) and K-means algorithm
with two simultaneous cost functions as well-separated
clusters by DBI and local optimization by MSE. The
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algorithm utilizes the iteratively global search ability
of PSO to find optimal or near optimal cluster cen-
troids and local search ability of K-means to avoid be-
ing trapped in a local optimal solution. A new boundary
handling approach is also utilized in the PSO to not only
select linearly the best set of parameters but fulfill also
exploration and exploitation issues. When the optimal
placement of clusters centroids and objects are defined,
they are sent to the second phase. In the detection phase,
we employ a fuzzy approach by the combination of two
distance-based methods as classification and outlier to
detect anomalies in new monitoring data.
Convergence of the proposed fuzzy anomaly detection
system is studied for finding the global and optimal re-
sults and measuring the suitable performance over dif-
ferent CCN traffic flows (Table 4 from training phase
and Tables 10 and 12 from detection phase). Experi-
mental results show that the applied CCN traffic flows
could be used well for both training and detection phase
as well as preexisting methods from the literature.
Convergence of the proposed method is also studied for
finding global classification of different benchmarking
data sets as Iris, Glass, Wine, Ionosphere and Zoo. Ex-
perimental results (Table 3) show the accuracy and the
robustness of our proposed method based on the average
of correct classification and lower standard deviation as
compared to other methods.
The feasibility and efficiency of proposed system in
training phase compared to nine different approaches.
Table 4 depicts the final results using K-means, PSO
(MSE), PSO (DBI, MSE), PSO-Kmeans (MSE), meth-
ods [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], and our proposed method
as PSO-Kmeans (DBI, MSE). The proposed training
phase outperforms other methods based on the opti-
mal results as DR = 100%, FPR = 1.847% and F-
measure = 98.99 %. In the training phase, future work
is needed in the application of multi-objective optimiza-
tion techniques. Moreover, detection phase results are
very capable for anomaly detection purposes. The vari-
ous membership functions are employed to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed method among applied
well-performing methods in Table 10. In the most cases,
the proposed anomaly detection method performed bet-
ter than other methods based on the RMSE, minimum
and maximum error between target and predicted output
at the same time. Specifically, optimal results gained by
trapmf and gauss2mf MF. In the detection phase, future
work is needed in the application of non-linear member-
ship functions.
Our proposed method and the other methods use dif-
ferent parameter settings and were repeated 10 times
independently to find the global results in the training
phase; therefore, the effect of tuning parameters on per-
formance of the methods are studied.
We continue our anomaly detection performance mea-
surements by applying well-performing and preexisting
methods (from Table 10) and our proposed method over
two applied data sets (Tables 8 and 9). As shown in Figs.
9-12 and Table 12, the proposed fuzzy and non-fuzzy
anomaly detection phase can outperform other meth-
ods. In addition, the times of increment on computa-
tional time of proposed method is relative smaller than
the other considered methods (Table 14).
10. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel fuzzy anomaly de-
tection system based on the hybridization of PSO and
K-means clustering algorithms over Content-Centric
Networks (CCNs). This system consists of two phases:
the training phase with two simultaneous cost func-
tions as well-separated clusters by DBI and local op-
timization by MSE, and the detection phase with two
combination-based distance approaches as classifica-
tion and outlier. Experimental results and analysis show
the proposed method in the training phase is very ef-
fective in determining the optimal number of clusters,
and has a very high detection rate and a very low false
positive rate at the same time. In the detection phase,
the proposed method clearly outperforms other applied
method in terms of AUC (area under the ROC curve),
accuracy, sensitivity and specificity. In addition, the
times of increment on computational time of proposed
method is relative smaller than the other considered
methods.
We are currently working on several improvements of
the presented approach with the application of com-
putational intelligence methodologies (such as multi-
objective optimization techniques) to propose a robust
method to improve the accuracy of detection rate and
reduce false positive rate over different CCNs traffics.
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